Abstract: This paper studies how income inequality affects the probability of signing free trade agreements (FTAs) in a political economy framework. The median voter approach to FTA formation within a Heckscher-Ohlin framework predicts that an increase in inequality lowers the desirability of an 
Introduction
Since the European Economic Community (EEC) came into force in 1958, there has been a steady rise in the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) reported to the GATT/WTO. These RTAs violate the principle of nondiscrimination (the MFN Clause) and are fundamentally altering the world trade landscape. Same as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, signing an RTA is also endogenous. So what are the driving forces behind these RTAs? Besides some economic (e.g. the market sizes of partner countries) and geographic (e.g. bilateral distance) factors, political economy factors are also important in RTA formation. In this paper, we investigate RTA formation in a political economy framework. Only free trade areas and customs unions are considered and they are together called free trade agreements (FTAs) in this paper. The partial scope preferential arrangements signed under the Enabling Clause of the GATT are not included because these arrangements are not full-fledged and were usually singed among developing countries with very limited product coverage.
1 In addition, service agreements, a type of RTA notification to the WTO, are not treated as separate agreements in this paper because they were usually signed together or after the corresponding FTAs in goods.
According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, there are both winners and losers from FTAs. This redistributive consequence will present as long as a country differs from its trading partners in factor endowments. FTA decisions will be eventually determined by how the preferences of politicians and their parties, interest groups and voters are aggregated in political processes. To fully understand FTAs, it is important to open the black box of the political economy of FTA formation. Where theories deliver empirically testable predictions, there are two main branches in the literature of the political economy of trade policy (Gawande and Krishna, 2003) . The first branch represents direct democracy or median voter approach with the implicit assumption that voters vote directly upon trade policy or government chooses 1 The Enabling Clause of the GATT permits developing countries to exchange partial tariff preference within arrangement such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). In a famous example, Indonesia, a member of ASEAN and a country on the equator, excluded major sectors but offered to liberalize imports of snow ploughs from other ASEAN countries (Panagariya, 1994) .
capital, which will lead to freer trade in capital-abundant countries, but more protection in labor-abundant countries.
It is largely an empirical question which model is correct. This paper contributes to the literature by empirically testing these conflicting theories in the context of FTAs. Our empirical strategy is similar to Dutt and Mitra (2002) . They use aggregate trade policy data, such as tariffs, quotas and openness, and find empirical support for the median voter model proposed by Mayer (1984) . The aggregate trade policy data, however, conceal the discriminatory nature of trade policy. This calls for a bilateral analysis. We use a large bilateral FTA panel dataset to test the two conflicting models. With a bilateral dataset, we can tell which country is relatively labor-abundant or capital-abundant and provide a more direct test of the models. In addition, with bilateral data, we can use the difference between two countries' capital labor ratios to capture more precisely the magnitude of the Heckscher-Ohlin distributional effects.
Researchers usually resort to standard discrete choice model (e.g. probit or logit) to analyze binary FTA data. With panel data, however, this method is inappropriate because it requires the conditional independence assumption for FTAs. Due to the binary and irreversible nature of FTAs, this assumption is obviously violated. For example, the NAFTA after 1994 is, by no means, independent of the NAFTA in 1994. In this paper, we propose a duration analysis to address this problem in a panel data setting. Our results provide strong support for the predictions from the median voter model.
It is important to note that the support of the median voter model should not be taken too literally in the context of direct democracy and single-peaked preference. We can have exactly the same pro-labor policies as predicted by the median voter model if a government is concerned about inequality, as in Limao and Panagariya (2006) . The intuition is clear: if a government is concerned about inequality, trade policies will be pro-labor as workers are poorer than capitalists. Therefore, the median voter model should be taken as a short-hand way to capture the effects of electoral competition, general concerns for popular support or partisan ideological preference for equality. As Alesina and Rodrik (1994) point out, "We appeal to this theorem to capture the basic idea that any government is likely to be responsive to the wishes of the majority when key distributional issues are at stake. Even a dictator cannot completely ignore social demands for fear of being overthrown. Thus, even in a dictatorship, distributional issues affecting the majority of the population will influence policy outcomes."
The results in this paper deliver some policy implications for both the "static welfare effect" of FTAs and the "dynamic time path" issues related to the move from regionalism to multilateralism. Coined by Bhagwati (1993) , the "static welfare effect" of regionalism is the immediate impact of FTAs on world welfare; and the "dynamic time path" discusses the role of FTAs as "stepping stones" or "stumbling blocks" towards multilateralism. "Static welfare effect" arguments focus on trade creation and diversion.
According to the classic analysis of Viner (1950) , an FTA is welfare improving if the trade creation effect dominates the trade diversion effect. Manipulations by special interest groups representing importcompeting sectors are often considered a source of trade diversion and stumbling block effect. Grossman and Helpman (1995) show in a lobbying model that the exclusion of some highly-protected sectors from an FTA can dilute the opposition of pressure groups and increase the probability that the FTA is adopted.
Frankel, Wei and Stein (1997, chapter 10) and Schiff and Winters (2003, chapter 3) also argue that lobbies bias FTAs toward trade diversion and may prevent an FTA from being a "stepping stone" toward multilateralism. These dangers are elegantly demonstrated by Krishna (1998) in a three-country model.
The concern about adverse effects of lobbying is probably the primary reason why the GATT Article XXIV stipulates that free trade areas and custom unions should cover "substantially all the trade" within the blocs, not just a limited number of sectors. The support for the median voter model rather than the lobbying model sends an encouraging message to the current movement of regionalism.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, we derive a modified political economy model of FTAs proposed by Levy (1997) and provide the empirical support for the median voter model. Secondly, we propose a more appropriate empirical strategy for bilateral panel data analysis than has been seen so far in the empirical literature on FTAs. Thirdly, the problem of partial observability of FTA formation is also considered for the first time in the FTA literature. Finally, this paper is one of the first empirical studies on the political economy of FTAs and adds new evidences to the political economy determinants of FTAs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a modified version of Levy's median voter model of FTAs and perform some comparative statics; Section 3 lays out the empirical strategies; Section 4 discusses the econometric methodology. Section 5 describes the data. Regression results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 provides some robustness checks and discusses some related complexities. And Section 8 concludes.
Theoretical framework
Levy (1997) develops a median voter theory of FTAs with differentiated products in a HeckscherOhlin framework. In the paper, Levy studies how FTAs may serve as stumbling blocks or stepping stones for the multilateral trading system. We instead focus on the model's implications on how inequality might affect FTA formation. We modify Levy's model by changing the production function of differentiated products to make sure that the equilibrium solution always exists. 3 The model assumes that countries differ only in factor endowments -capital (K) and labor (L) -and the distribution of factor ownership. There are two sectors of production: homogeneous products (Y) and differentiated products (X). The homogeneous products (Y, numeraire goods) are produced under constant returns to scale with a production function defined as , where 1 > ξ is the IRS parameter. This production function leads to indeterminacy of the model as the profit maximization condition (MC=MR) and the free entry condition (p=AC) are parallel to each other and will never cross to give a solution in x. We solve this problem by adding a fixed cost. . When agents vote for or against an FTA, they need to compare their utilities before the FTA to their utilities after the FTA. Agent i's utility under FTA relative to autarky can be written as: Levy (1997) calls the first two terms on the right hand side of equation (1) the "comparative advantage effect" (CAE) and calls the last term on the right hand side of equation (1) the "variety effect" (VE). The magnitude of the relative utility determines the desirability of an FTA to the agent. From now on, let us assume this agent is the median voter; then the relative utility of this "marginal" voter determines the desirability of an FTA to the country under majority voting. The reduced forms of CAE and VE for the median voter can be solved from a general equilibrium system.
is a function of parameters; 
is the median voter's capital labor ratio relative to the overall capital labor ratio under autarky, which is always less than one for any unequal society and can be used to measure the degree of "equality". 5 Equation (2) offers a testable prediction on the relationship between equality and the desirability of an FTA conditional on a country's K/L. To see this more clearly, let us take natural logarithm of the CAE and obtain the derivative with respective to equality ( mv (2) is similar to equation (15) on page 516 in Levy (1997) . His formula of parameters b, which is called θ in Levy (1997) , is incorrect. Our equation (3) is same as equation (12) on page 515 in Levy (1997) . The homothetic production function in Levy (1997) does not affect the main results of the model largely due to another mistake he makes on the free-entry condition. Specifically Levy's formula for the optimal production of x * on page 515 in Levy (1997) is incorrect based on his homothetic production function. Without the second mistake, he would not have been able to solve for x * or have a "well-defined" equilibrium. Please refer to Liu (2007) for detailed discussion on these issues. 5 For example, if we classify all citizens in a country into five quintiles according to their capital assets per capita and the median group (third quintile) has totally L 3 persons and K 3 capital assets, then we can show that 3
is equivalent to five times Q3 (the capital or income share of the third quintile -a often used measure of equality). The intuition of this proposition is as follows. With a higher degree of income inequality, the median voter is likely to be relatively better endowed with labor and would stand to benefit (lose) more from an FTA with country that is relatively more capital rich (poor). In the empirical analysis, we regress an FTA dummy on countries' inequality measure (Gini coefficient) or equality measure (the income share of third quintile, Q3). To take the magnitude of the Heckscher-Ohlin effect into account, Gini (Q3) is multiplied by the difference in capital labor ratios of the two countries in a pair.
The median voter theory shown above also offers another testable prediction. The variety effect in equation (3) Therefore every country wants to sign FTAs with big partners. Because signing an FTA is a joint decision, another testable prediction can be stated as follows: Proposition 2: An FTA is more likely signed between two big countries. Equation (3) shows that an increase in n FTA will raise VE, which implies that a country would prefer a big rather small country as its FTA partner. As a result of joint decision, an FTA is more likely signed between two big countries and less likely signed between countries with very different economic sizes.
Empirically, we use the logarithm of the product of the two countries' GDPs in a pair (or the sum of log(GDP)) and the logarithm of the ratio of the two countries' GDPs (or the difference in log(GDP)) to test for the variety effect hypothesis. The sum of log(GDP) is expected to be positively correlated with the probability of signing an FTA; and the difference in log(GDP) is expected to be negatively correlated with the probability.
It is important to control for the variety effects and other factors in the analysis. For example, the median voter model alone suggests that no government will be willing to form an FTA with laborabundant partners even if its income inequality is low because the median voter will lose from such an FTA. When we also consider the variety effects and other control factors, however, the median voter in a capital-abundant country can actually gain overall from an FTA with labor-abundant countries despite the loss from comparative advantage effect. Therefore both propositions 1 and 2 should be considered in the analysis of FTA formation.
Estimation Strategies
We are interested in testing how income inequality might affect the likelihood of FTAs based on the capital labor ratios of the two countries in a pair. In other words, how is the probability of an FTA affected by the interactions of the inequalities and capital labor ratios of the two countries? Gini coefficient is used as the measure of inequality. Alternatively, the income share of the third (median) quintile of the income distribution (Q3) is used as a measure of "equality". The two measures are usually highly negatively correlated. The expected signs of the coefficients of Gini and Q3 should be opposite to each other. The model specification in our empirical analysis is given by
The dependent variable is a dummy, indicating whether the two countries i and j had FTA relationship or not in a given year. 6 The first six variables are of particular interests. X ij is a vector of some geographic, institutional and political variables, and ij ε is the error term. Except the geographic covariates, most variables are time-varying. The year subscripts, however, are omitted to simplify the formula.
The first two variables are the sum and the absolute difference of log(GDP) of the two countries for each observation, which are used to test for the variety effect as described in previous section. We expect β must be negative. This implies that the rich partner is less willing to enter into an FTA if they are more unequal because the median voter holding relatively less capital will lose more from free trade. This effect is augmented by β must be negative. This implies that the poor partner is more inclined to enter into an FTA if they are more unequal because the median voter holding relatively less capital will gain more from free trade.
Similarly, no mater country i is a rich country (k i >k j ) or poor country (k i <k j ) compared to country j, the expected sign of 6 β is always positive according to the median voter model. In sum, when we use Gini coefficients in regressions, we should expect negative and positive signs on 5 β and 6 β respectively.
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The above discussions are about the median voter model. If the lobbying model is instead supported, all the sign patterns discussed above will be reversed. Apparently, the sign pattern should be exactly opposite if we substitute Q3 for Gini in the regressions.
Econometric Methodology
Researchers usually resort to standard discrete choice model (e.g. probit or logit) to analyze binary FTA data. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) use a cross-sectional dataset and focus on the economic determinants of FTAs. Magee (2004) extends the analysis to a panel data setting and also considers some political variables. Both papers use bilateral data and run probit regressions on an FTA dummy variable.
A cross section analysis as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) seems acceptable if much of the variations come from cross sectional dimension. But panel data allow us to use more information on the timevarying variables and easily deal with unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, the next natural step is to explore the richer information in panel data. The standard probit and logit, however, are inappropriate for panel data because they assume that the dependent variable (FTA dummy) is conditionally independent over time. To see this, let us take the NAFTA as an example. Mexico signed the NAFTA with the US and Canada in 1994, and they will have the NAFTA for all the following years. It is problematic to assume that the NAFTA in 1995 and after is independent to the NAFTA in 1994, no matter how many variables are used as controls. Using standard probit or logit with FTA panel data, we would blindly predict something that is already predetermined and the results would be misleading. Traditional techniques dealing with temporal correlation will not help as the problem here is much more serious than serial correlation. This is a problem of exact correlation due to the irreversible nature of FTAs and will lead to serious bias in the estimation.
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In this paper, we propose a duration analysis to solve this problem. It is useful to note that we are only interested in the spells before the formation of FTAs, not the spells after FTAs. If we do not use the information after FTAs were formed, we can effectively avoid the conditional dependence problem as in the standard logit analysis. This insight leads us to consider the duration analysis (or survival analysis).
Depending assumes that the time is continuous and two incidences such as signing FTAs should not happen exactly at the same moment or within the same time interval (i.e., year). A discrete-duration analysis, however, allows "ties" because it assumes that time is discrete or grouped and many incidences might happen simultaneously in a given time interval. Therefore, discrete-time duration analysis turns out to be a natural choice. Applications with similar data structure as FTAs can be found in international relations literature, such as Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) . They applied the duration analysis to international disputes (a binary dependent variable), using a panel dataset over years 1951-1985.
Discrete Time Duration Analysis
The discrete time duration analysis is nothing but the standard complementary log-log (cloglog) regression with duration dependence. All we need is to amend the dataset by dropping all but the first positive outcomes of the dependent variable for each country pair. Dropping the repeated "1"s does not lose any useful information as we are only interested in the spells before FTAs were formed. Once the repeated "1"s are dropped, the problem of conditional dependence in the standard logit analysis disappears. Another advantage of the duration analysis is that it reduces the endogeneity problem of covariates. After dropping the repeated "1"s from the FTA variable, we can hardly think of any feedback from FTAs to inequality and other covariates. Of course, possible simultaneity problem may still exist, but can be alleviated by considering unobserved heterogeneity, as will be discussed later.
Following Jenkins (1995 Jenkins ( , 2004 , we can show that the maximum likelihood function for a discrete time duration analysis has exactly the same form as the standard likelihood function for a binary choice model. For any country pair ij, the hazard rate to sign an FTA in year t is
, which is the probability the two countries signed an FTA in year t conditional on that they had not signed the agreement until year t-1. Let ij t denotes the last year of a country pair ij's spell in the dataset, which is different for different country pairs. In the last year ( ij t ), country pair ij's spell is either right , where X are country characteristics and t θ is a transformation of the baseline hazard, we can run a cloglog regression on the amended dataset. This is an exact grouped duration analogue of the continuous time Cox proportional hazards model (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978; Jenkins, 2004) . Alternatively, we could assume a logistic hazard
and run a logit regression. Logit link function also corresponds to an underlying continuous time duration model in which the within-interval durations follow a log-logistic distribution, but it imposes more complicated time-interactions than the proportional hazard model (Sueyoshi, 1995) .
Most researchers are more familiar with logistic than cloglog function. Actually it is easy to show that, when the probability of positive outcomes is small as in the case of FTAs 9 , a cloglog link function is very close to a logistic link function. Hence the coefficients got from cloglog regressions can be exponentiated and understood in terms of odds ratio.
Duration Dependence
The duration dependence is analogous to the baseline hazard in the Cox model, which can be captured by time dummies or a polynomial of a time counter since the beginning of spells. The increasing trend in the number of FTAs over time suggests that the time trend must be taken into account. 10 If year dummies are used to account for duration dependence, all the years without new FTAs will be dropped because the year dummies perfectly predict these zero outcomes. To avoid this problem, we create a time counter to count the number of years already past since 1960 (the beginning of the sample), as well as its square, cubic terms and so on. Then we use the polynomial to account for the time dependence. The order of the polynomial is determined by the best fit of regressions.
Unobserved Heterogeneity and Endogeneity
We may think that some country pairs are more likely to form an FTA due to omitted variables. 
respectively. If we assume a normal distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity u, we can use random effects cloglog or random effects logit.
12 Alternatively, Meyer (1990) assumes that unobserved heterogeneity follows a 9 After dropping all but the first "1"s, positive outcomes account for only 0.3% in the amended dataset. 10 It also captures the "domino effect" of FTAs as suggested by Baldwin (1996) . 11 Lancaster (1990, chapter 4) provides a proof for the case when unobserved heterogeneity follows a Gamma distribution. 12 No consistent fixed effect cloglog procedure is available. The fixed effect logit procedure (i.e. conditional logit) is available but inappropriate because most of the country pairs have never signed FTAs and these observations will be dropped in fixed effect logit regressions and we will lose much of the cross sectional variations.
gamma mixture distribution and proposes a model for discrete time proportional hazards regression on grouped duration data. Heckman and Singer (1984) instead propose a nonparametric approach to frailty.
We will try both methods as robustness checks.
Data
We 15 The extrapolated data at least capture much of the between variations of Gini (Q3) across countries, which account for nearly 90% of total variations. representing higher level of hostility. 17 The Formal Alliance dataset (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004) seeks to identify each formal alliance between at least two states that fall into the classes of defense pact, neutrality or non-aggression treaty, or entente agreement. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for these variables for year 2000.
Empirical Results
This section shows the regression results from the standard logit and the duration analyses. Table 2 shows the standard logit results. If we believe that FTA decisions are mainly based on cross sectional variations of the covariates, we can use cross sectional data and apply standard probit or logit, as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) . The first three columns use cross sectional data for year 2000 only (the most recent year with capital per worker data available). Column (1) uses the baseline specification, including some economic and geographic variables often used in the literature. In column (2), we add the key interaction terms between Gini (Q3) and the difference in the logarithms of capital per worker and some other political covariates. As reflected by the sign flips of the coefficients of the key interaction terms in column (2) , the median voter model is strongly supported. The Pseudo R 2 , measured as one minus the ratio of the log-likelihood value for the estimated model to that of the intercept only model, increases from 0.46 to 0.58. In terms of prediction power, the percentages of correctly predicted negative outcomes are both as high as 98%, but the percentage of correctly predicted positive outcomes (FTA=1) increases from 45% in column (1) to 59% in column (2) . 19 Overall the increase in goodness-of-fit by 16 Baier and Bergstrand (2006) show using simulations that ad-hoc remoteness variables leads to biased coefficient estimates and therefore is of little use in the gravity equation. This criticism applies with less force here, however, because this is not a structural model and the remoteness variable is only trying to capture external trade diversion. 17 Because the effect of military conflict may persist for many years after a conflict, the data should not be used on a yearly base. Instead, the average hostility level for country pairs over 1946-2001 is used to measure the conflict intensity after the World War II. 18 We use term "standard" logit to distinguish it from the duration analysis, which can also use logit for discrete-time data. For clear comparison with duration analysis and easy understanding of the coefficients in terms of odds ratio, logit rather than probit is used. 19 A positive outcome is correctly predicted if its predicted probability is larger than 0.5; and a zero outcome is correctly predicted if its predicted probability is less than 0.5. Although the number of FTAs has been increasing rapidly in recent years, FTA is still a rare event as only about 9% of country pairs in 2000 had positive outcomes adding the political economy variables is fairly large. This is different from the finding by Baier and Bergstrand (2004) , who claim that the political economy variables are not important in FTA formation. It is also interesting to note that the coefficient of the absolute difference in log(k) is negative and significant in column (1), 20 but turns positive and significant in column (2) . The prediction by the Heckscher-Ohlin model is supported only after the other relevant political economy covariates are controlled for. This again implies the importance of controlling for other relevant political economy variables. In addition, the variety effect is also supported as reflected by the coefficients on the sum and absolute difference of log(GDP); and most of the other covariates have the expected signs.
Standard logit results
Although the cross sectional analyses already provides support for the median voter model, these results are not perfect as they do not use all the information in time-varying variables and are often contaminated by omitted variable bias. It is naturally the next step to extend the cross sectional analyses to panel analyses. Columns (4)- (7) in Table 2 show the standard logit results using pooled data with year dummies and panel data with both year dummies and country pair random effects. Most of the coefficients of the interaction terms, however, become insignificant. In terms of the prediction power for the positive outcomes (FTA=1), the random effect regression is worse than the pooled data regression (36% vs. 46%), and both are worse than the cross section regression (59%). In addition, the country pair random effects regressions are highly sensitive to the number of points used for quadrature. 21 This suggests that these results are not reliable. More importantly, with the violation of the conditional independence assumption, the results from random effects logit are biased and misleading. To address this problem, we turn to duration analysis.
(FTA=1). For a rare event, it is always much easier to predict zero outcomes (FTA=0) than positive outcomes. A constant only logit regression would result in a predicted probability of FTA of 0.09 for every observation, hence the percentage of correctly predict zero outcomes would be 1-9%=91%. This is why we do not rely on the percentage of pairs correctly predicted with zero outcomes [% predict(0) in Table 2 ] or the overall prediction power [% predict(all) in Table 2 ]. The low prediction power for positive outcomes is not surprising, given that FTA is a rare event. 20 This is consistent to the unconditional means of the absolute difference in log(k) in Table 1 for the sub-sample with FTA=1 and the sub-sample with FTA=0 (i.e. 0.78<1.67). 21 The random effects in logit can not be integrated out in the likelihood function, so have to be approximated by quarature. Table 3 shows the results from the duration analysis (cloglog). The duration data include all the years from 1960 to 2000, but were amended by dropping all but the first positive outcomes for each country pair. The duration dependence is captured by a sixth-order polynomial of the time counter, which provides the best fit to the data. 22 The first two columns show the results using a baseline specification.
Duration Analysis
Even in the baseline regressions, the median voter model, including the variety effect, is strongly supported. Similar to the standard logit results, the coefficient of the absolute difference in log(k) is still negative and significant without controlling for other political economy variables. Columns (3) and (4) use the full specification with other political economy and geographic variables. Now the coefficient on the absolute difference in log(k) is positive and significant, as predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Although the variety effect is still supported, the magnitudes of the coefficients on the sum and absolute difference of log(GDP) are greatly reduced. On the contrary, the magnitudes of the coefficients on the two key interaction terms almost double, implying even stronger support for the median voter model. The last two columns in Table 3 report the results from country pair random effects cloglog regressions. The unobserved heterogeneity accounts for 17% of the overall variations in the error term, as shown by the "rho" in the last row of Table 3 . The support for the median voter model is slightly stronger than in
Columns (3) and (4), but using random effects does not change the results much. 23 It is worth noting that we do not attempt to predict the timing of FTA formation in duration analysis because positive outcomes of FTA variable ("1"s) only account for 0.3% of the observations after the repeated "1"s are dropped. If an event is rare, it is always difficult to predict.
Taking the results in columns (5) and (6) in Table 3 as preferred, we can quantify the magnitude of the coefficients of the interaction terms. Taking derivative of Prob(FTA) with respect to i GINI yields 22 Plotting the estimated duration dependence against time (year) yields a smooth upward slopping curve. 23 As robustness checks, we also consider the gamma mixture frailty proposed by Meyer (1990) and the Heckman and Singer-type nonparametric representations of frailty (Heckman and Singer, 1984) . The results are very similar to those in the last two columns of Table 3 .
Based on the mean of the absolute difference in log(k) (=1.58 in Table 1 By a similar calculation, the results in column (6) of Table 3 imply that one unit increase in Q3 in the rich (poor) country increases (decreases) the odds ratio by about 6.95%, ceteris paribus. The magnitude of the coefficient of Q3 is much bigger than that of Gini because the mean values of Gini and Q3 are very different (40 and 15 respectively). In terms of elasticity, the two magnitudes are very similar (about 0.9
for Gini and 1.0 for Q3). 25 This says that one percent change in Gini (Q3) can change the odds ratio of an FTA by 0.9 (1.0) percent. These magnitudes are significant economically, compared to the elasticity of geographic distance (1.5) -the most important and robust determinant of FTAs, and the elasticities of the product and ratio of GDPs (0.08 and -0.1 respectively). 26 For example, if Gini increases by 33% from 45 (e.g. Peru, 1995) to 60 (e.g. Brazil, 1995) , the odds ratio of an FTA will, on average, change by 0.9*33%=30%, ceteris paribus.
Most of the coefficients of other covariates have the expected signs and magnitudes. Countries close in distance are more likely to form FTAs. Conditioned on distance, adjacent countries are surprisingly less likely to form FTAs, which is the same as the finding by Magee (2004) . One possible explanation is that, conditional on geographic distance, adjacent countries are more likely to suffer from conflicts, such as many Middle East and African countries. Landlocked and island countries are less likely to form FTAs.
Countries with similar polity scores and labor/environment standards are more likely to form FTAs.
Countries ever colonized by the same parent country are more likely to form FTAs, but not statistically significant. Hostility prevents countries from forming FTAs; while formal alliance relationship helps FTA 24 The mean is still the same (1.58) if we consider separately the cases when k i >k j and k i <k j . 25 The elasticity of Gini is calculated as 0.023/(1/40) = 0.9; the elasticity of Q3 is calculated as 0.0695/(1/15) = 1. 
Robustness Checks and Related Complexities

Democracy vs. autocracy?
If the support for the median voter model is the evidence of electoral competition (or any policies seeking popular support) or governments' inequality concern, it is likely that the support will be stronger in democratic countries than in autocratic countries. This is because democratic governments, to ensure their re-election, are more likely to adopt policies that benefit the majority. In this sub-section, we run the regressions on the sub-samples of the data according to the degrees of partner countries' democracies.
The data on countries' democracies come from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) . 26 The coefficients of distance and the product and ratio of GDPs can be directly taken as the elasticities because they are in logarithms. 27 For example, Frankel, Stein and Wei (1997, p. 143) and Dalgin, Mitra and Trindade (2004) , among many others, also find negative coefficient on remoteness from some gravity regressions for bilateral trade flows. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) find positive coefficient on remoteness for FTAs, but their remoteness measure is multiplied by the dummy variable indicating the same continent. We do get positive coefficient when using the same definition as Baier and Bergstrand (2004) , but the explanations will be different. The measure of remoteness does not affect the support for the median voter model. 28 "Natural" FTAs are often associated with more trade creation and less trade diversion (Krugman, 1995, p. 182) . Krishna (2003) , however, does not find empirical support for the welfare-improving effects from US data. The estimation strategy of our paper is not based on a structure model and bilateral trade simply enters the regression as a control variable. Due to many differences in the data and methods, the results of Krishna (2003) and ours are not really comparable. But we believe that the endogeneity problem of trade flows can be better addressed in a general equilibrium framework as in Krishna (2003) .
"Polity" score data range from -10 to 10, with higher values representing more democratic regimes.
Countries with positive "polity" scores are considered as democratic countries; and countries with zero or negative scores are taken as non-democratic countries (neutral or autocratic). Table 4 reports the duration analysis results using the sub-samples. 29 Columns (1) and (2) use the subsample with both countries in a pair being democratic; while columns (3) and (4) use the sub-sample with neither country in a pair being democratic. As reflected by the larger magnitudes of the coefficients on two key interaction terms in the first two columns, the support for the median voter model is indeed stronger compared to the previous results using the full sample. By contrast, in columns (3) and (4), the key interaction terms are always insignificant when both partners are non-democratic. These results are consistent to the fact that democratic governments are more concerned about getting popular support due to electoral competition compared to autocratic governments.
Partial observability of FTA formation
For the FTA dummy, we observe "1" when both partners want to sign an FTA, and zero when either country does not want to sign the FTA. When the FTA dummy equals to zero, we only observe the product of two partners' decisions, rather than their individual preferences. This is a problem of "partial observability". With this problem, an increase in one country's willingness of an FTA, due to changes in its own inequality, might not necessarily imply an increase in the probability of signing the agreement if the other country is unwilling to sign the FTA. This problem, however, only makes our decision in favor of the null hypothesis that inequality does not affect the probability of signing an FTA. Given that we have already found strong support for the median voter model, the support would be even stronger were we able to solve the partial observability problem. Moreover, the possible bias in the coefficients due to the partial observability problem is alleviated by the fact that reciprocity and concessions are common practice in FTA formation. One country can request from or offer to its partner some "benefits" through international transfers or side-payments if one of them is unwilling to sign the agreement. For example, in order to conclude on the NAFTA, Mexico had to sign the side agreements on labor and environment standards proposed by the US. 30 In this sense, an increase in the desirability of an FTA to one country alone can increase the probability of signing the agreement through international transfers, even if the other country does not want to sign it initially. Therefore, the previous duration analysis is still valid by testing the effects of each partner's inequality on joint FTA decisions.
To address the partial observability problem formally, we follow the early literature on partial observability (e.g., Poirier, 1980; Abowd and Farber, 1982) by estimating the probability of signing an FTA as the product of the desirabilities of the FTA to each partner. The log likelihood function can be written as: The estimation of the likelihood function (8) will produce two sets of coefficients, β R and β P , for rich and poor partners respectively.
Different from previous analyses, we do not have to use the absolute values of the differences in GDP, polity scores, child labor and CO2 per capita (undirectional differences). Rather, the directional differences in these variables can be used. For example, we include "dGDP(RP)" [=log(GDP(R))-log(GDP(P))] and "dGDP(PR)" [=log(GDP(P))-log(GDP(R))] as separate variables for the rich and poor partners respectively. We expect that the coefficients of dGDP(RP) and dGDP(PR) are both negative. In other words, a rich (poor) partner is less likely to sign an FTA if its poor (rich) partner's GDP is small. 29 Because using country pair random effects make little difference in most of the sub-samples, unobserved heterogeneity is ignored in these regressions. 30 Theoretical discussions on the international transfers and side-payments under customs unions, free trade areas and the WTO can be found in Kemp and Wan (1976) , Aghion, Antras and Helpman (2004) and Bagwell and Staiger (2004) , among others.
The differences of all the other variables are constructed in the same way. "Remoteness" variable is also separated as "remoteness(R)" and "remoteness(P)" for rich and poor countries. 31 According to the theory, we assume that inequality of a country does not affect the desirability of FTA of the other country in a pair. Hence we include Gini(R) or Q3(R) in x R , and Gini(P) or Q3(P) in x P .
The results from logit regressions with partial observability are shown in Table 5 . The first two columns are from the regressions using Gini coefficient, while the last two columns use Q3 measure. The signs of the coefficients of Gini and Q3 still strongly support the median voter model. As expected, the magnitudes on average are even bigger than what we get from duration analyses in Table 3 . Many other covariates are less significant, compared to previous duration analyses. It is not surprising because the log likelihood functions of partial observability model are not globally concave and are much more difficult to estimate. 32 To save space, we do not discuss here in details the results for other covariates. 
Left and right censorings of duration spells
In order to use duration analysis, researchers must know when the spell before an FTA starts and which countries are in the risk set. It is natural to think that all of the countries started to face the "risk" of as the first year does not cause much problem. Equally left censoring is irrelevant for the estimation of coefficients if no FTA formed before 1958, because the discrete hazard is a conditional probability and all the probabilities of the earlier years are conditioned out of the likelihood function (Jenkins, 1995, and Sueyoshi, 1995) . Because many covariates in the regressions have data available only since 1960, year 1960 rather than 1958 is taken as the first year in our analysis, at the cost of losing the country pairs 31 See Data section for the definition of "remoteness" for a single country. 32 We use "BHHH" method with "difficult" option. 33 We do not consider unobserved heterogeneity. LIMDEP8.0 develops a routine for panel data, but the random parameters model is difficult to implement, even for simulated data (Greene, 2002, E17.5) . We are not aware of any application of this panel data procedure in the literature.
between the original signatories of the Treaty of Rome. 34 The subsequent accessions of other European Community members after 1960, however, are still kept in the analysis. Another problem is associated to those countries that enter the sample after 1960, such as the newly-independent countries from former colonies, the USSR or Yugoslavia. Most of the new states from formal USSR and Yugoslavia, however, are not covered in the sample due to missing covariate data.
Spells are "right-censored" if some country pairs have never signed FTAs until the end of the sample period. This is not a problem because these country pairs simply contribute a string of zeros, with no final one, to the likelihood.
Multi-country FTAs
Many FTAs have more than two member countries. When a country decides to join an FTA, it considers all the members together. We could consider multi-country FTAs by including the variables measuring the bloc sizes. This method, however, suffers from endogeneity problem because the bloc size measure uses the information from the dependent variable (FTA membership). This problem is especially serious in our duration analysis with few positive outcomes (0.3%). Please note that, even for these multicountry FTAs, many decisions were actually made on a bilateral basis. For example, the admission of new members into the EU requires unanimous approval from all the current EU members, which is an important aspect of equal right of the members. Moreover, a great deal of effort was expended to take into account the fact that different countries might join the same agreement at different years. Hence treating multi-country FTAs as bilateral ones, we may still obtain unbiased point estimates of the coefficients. 
Conclusions
Using duration analyses with a large FTA panel data, this paper finds that the predictions from the median voter model are strongly supported. The support for the median voter model implies that governments' concern for general interests on average dominates the concern for special interests in FTA 34 They are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands.
formation. Despite its simplicity (direct democracy, uni-dimensional policy space and single-peaked individual preference), median voter model has received compelling empirical support in the literature.
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But the support for the median voter model should not be taken too literally. It instead should be taken as a short-hand way to capture electoral competition, general policy orientation in seeking popular support or governments' inequality concern. Moreover, the support for the median voter model does not mean that special interest groups or lobbies are absent. The exclusion of some sensitive sectors from trade agreements, the prolonged phase out period of tariffs and the exploitation of rules of origin are all probably due to the pressures from interest groups.
The findings in this paper are important for the understanding of the conflicting distributional forces in an unequal world and the underlying political economy rationales for FTA formation. Understanding the interrelationship between FTA formation and these political economy factors can help us design more effective policies to achieve many other economic goals, such as growth, inequality and poverty reduction.
In addition, this paper also offers important policy implications for both the static welfare analysis and the dynamic time path issues of FTAs. The support for the median voter model implies less trade diversion from FTAs, hence sends an encouraging message to the current movement of regionalism. 35 The correlations between the pairs within multi-country FTAs can contaminate the estimates of standard errors. Clustered standard errors can not be obtained because one country might have several FTAs and clusters can not be mutual-exclusively defined. 36 For example, Poole and Daniels (1985) find that 80-90% of all the recorded voters in the US Congress can be explained with one dimension space. In public finance, Congleton and Shughart (1990) find that the median voter model provides a better explanation for large scale public programs than lobbying models. See Persson and Tabellini (4) and (5)); 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 3. "% predict(0)" is the percentage of country pairs correctly predicted with no FTAs; "% predict(1)" is the percentage of pairs correctly predicted with FTAs; and "% predict(all)" is the percentage of pairs correctly predicted with or without FTAs. (1)- (4)); 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 3. All the regressions use a six-order polynomial of the time counter to capture duration dependence. Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (clustered by country pairs) in parentheses; 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 3. The regressions use five-order polynomial of the time counter to capture duration dependence, 4. The variables in difference (i.e., "Diff.") are directional, rather than absolute values (see the text for more details). To save space, the directional differences for both rich and poor partners share the same variable name in the table.
